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The Business of Fraud
Purpose 
This paper will focus on fraud within companies in order to discover overarching themes of why, 
when, and where corporate fraud occurs. Fraud has significant financial, economic, and social 
implications that negatively impact a company’s business standing. Research will be based on 
recent frauds that have been tried through the United States Attorney’s office. Correlations will 
be drawn regarding the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s 
(COSO) framework, which is a foundation for companies who want to improve their internal 
controls. Based on the comparisons between the COSO framework and recent fraud activity, 
individual COSO principles can be analyzed for areas that are violated frequently. Evaluating 
specific weaknesses in internal controls will elicit trends to identify control areas that should be 
strengthened. From these results, it can be concluded how to integrate technology, internal 
controls, and other security measures in order to decrease fraud within a company. This analysis 
will provide a basis for companies looking to prevent, detect, and correct internal controls in 
relation to fraud.  
Literature Review  
Corporate crime, or corporate corruption, has become a topic of public interest since the 
American ‘Great Recession’ of 2007-2009. According to the Harvard Law Record, corporate 
crime has done more damage to society than all street crimes combined (Mokhiber, 2015). The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimates street crimes, such as burglaries and robberies, 
cost $4.5 billion a year, whereas money lost by fraud can amount to $6.3 billion (ACFE, 2016). 
Corporate corruption is rarely evaluated through government regulation, creating a small risk for 
repercussions or punishments. The undermining of such crimes allows the public to view 
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corruption as a routine business activity, when in fact, it is quite detrimental.  
 
Fraud is defined as “the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate 
misuse and misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (Wells, 2007, pg. 
2). There are four criteria used in the legal system that determine if fraud is present within the 
case, whether civil or criminal. These factors provide a strong basis in understanding what fraud 
is and the repercussions that can follow from fraudulent acts. The criteria include “a material 
false statement, knowledge that the statement was false, a victim’s reliance on the false 
statement, and damages resulting from this reliance” (Wells, 2007, pg. 3). When applied to a 
corporate setting, fraud can be regarded in two facets: misappropriation of assets or financial 
statement fraud. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), provides 
definitions on both these types. In the AICPA’s Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, 
misappropriation of assets involves the theft of an entity’s assets where the effect of the theft is 
not presented on the financial statements (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722). This same section describes 
financial statement fraud as intentional misstatement, or omission, of amounts, or disclosures, in 
financial statements, designed to deceive statement users (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722).  
 
SAS No. 82, also identifies conditions in which fraud generally occurs. The system described is 
known as the fraud triangle, depicted as Figure 1. The AICPA sees that, first, employees must 
demonstrate an incentive or a reason to commit fraud, known as pressure. Pressure can come 
from several factors including personal financial concerns or workplace troubles. Next, 
ineffective controls must be present within a company to provide an opportunity to commit 
fraud. For example, if an employee had the ability to write checks and also the duty of 
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reconciling the bank statements, there is an internal control lapse, which provides opportunities 
to commit fraud. Finally, a person must be able to justify, or rationalize, their actions both while 
committing a fraudulent act, and also after the crime. Frequent fraud rationalizations involve the 
fraudster seeing themselves as a victim, rather than as a criminal. With all three factors present, 
the AICPA considers the environment to be more prone to fraudulent threats, whether the intent 
is misappropriation of assets or financial statement fraud.  
 
Subsequent to an uncovered fraud, there are several consequences a company must face, as well 
as changes that must be implemented. A company must relieve a fraudster of their duties and 
proceed to hire, train, and monitor a new employee for that position. Next, the corporation’s 
internal culture and ethical standards should be assessed. With the discovery of fraud, all 
company employees should be reevaluated and briefed on the company’s moral standing and 
policy in order to prevent future fraudulent acts. Finally, a company must evaluate their internal 
 3
Figure 1: The Fraud Triangle  
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016)
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controls on how they detect and prevent fraud, and ultimately, how their system must adapt 
based on the current discovered fraudulent actions. While a company reasserts their internal 
structure, they must simultaneously evaluate the public damage the corporation faces. Fraud can 
impact investors’ trust in the company, leading to a decrease in capital for the corporation 
(Romney and Steinbart, 2015, pg. 68).  
 
These implications allude to the fact that fraud has a significant financial impact that affects both 
the company responsible and the economy. According to Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention 
and Detection, “it is impossible to determine the actual total costs [of fraud] since not all fraud is 
detected, not all detected fraud is reported, and not all reported fraud is legally pursued” (Rezaee, 
2002, pg. 8). Despite these difficulties, there is an investigative interest with accounting 
professionals, business managers, government agencies, and the media to understand and assess 
the costs associated with fraud. According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s 
(ACFE) Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study, 
valuing fraud is important because, “understanding the size of the problem brings attention to its 
impact, enables organizations to quantify their fraud risk, and helps management make educated 
decisions about investing in anti-fraud resources and programs” (ACPE, 2016, pg. 8). Fraud 
causes a company to have increased insurance and legal costs, as well as expenses from a loss in 
productivity. Other non-monetary fraud deficiencies include a decrease in employee morale and 
customer goodwill, loss of credibility, and negative stock market reactions.  
 
As indicated earlier, there are two main forms of fraudulent business activities, asset 
misappropriation and financial statement fraud. These two types of frauds can be broken down 
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and assessed in monetary terms. Asset misappropriation is understood to be the most common 
type of fraud committed. According to the ACFE Report to the Nations, an estimated 83% of the 
fraud cases studied were asset misappropriation. However, these cases were financially 
immaterial because they had lower costs/losses. The ACFE study found that the median asset 
misappropriation loss from fraud was $125,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 5). The same information 
valuation can be assessed for financial statement fraud. Only 10% of cases studied by the ACFE 
were considered financial statement fraud, indicating financial statement fraud is far less 
common than asset misappropriation. However, financial statement frauds did have a higher 
median loss at $925,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 5). These statistics are indicative as to why 
government regulation on fraud is seen as undermined. Government agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are concerned with company financial statement 
frauds because of their larger financial impact on the economy.  
 
The accounting profession has several oversight boards and institutions that regulate a 
corporation’s accounting practices. Notably, the SEC,  an agency of the federal government, 
administers the trading of assets, or securities, through laws, rules, regulations, and other 
activities. When a company is suspected of committing fraudulent acts, the SEC has the power to 
begin an investigation involving the corporation’s financial statements and other accounting 
documents.  
 
Another form of government regulation for fraudulent acts is through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX). Congress passed this act in 2002 in response to scandals involving Enron and 
WorldCom. SOX implemented rules and regulations for managers, accountants, and 
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stakeholders, alike. From an accounting prospective, it took the industry from being relatively 
autonomous, to heavily governed (Franklin, 2016, pg. 56). SOX Section 404 is considered to 
have the biggest impact on company management and accountants. It is written as: “issuers are 
required to publish information in their annual reports concerning the scope and adequacy of the 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. This statement shall also assess 
the effectiveness of such internal controls and procedures” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, par. 2). 
SOX created the importance of implementing internal controls, along with updating and 
assessing their effectiveness.  
 
One of the more significant implications of SOX is that companies have a responsibility to create 
and maintain internal controls. An internal control is “a process effected by a company, designed 
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, 
reporting, and compliance” (Romney and Steinbart, 2015, pg. 345). This definition provides a 
broad statement of how a company looks to prevent, detect, and correct fraud. Preventing fraud 
is seen as a preemptive action, where internal controls reduce the likelihood of fraudulent acts. 
Segregating duties is an example of a preventative control, as it aims to deter fraud from 
happening. The AICPA defines segregation of duties as: “shared responsibilities of a key process 
that disperses the critical functions of that process to more than one person or 
department” (Ghosn, 2017, pg.1). Segregation of duties allows for procedures to be disbursed 
across a company in order to prevent the opportunity of committing fraud. Detecting fraud 
involves discovering problems quickly when they arise. Fraud detection can come from simple 
measures such as validating a bank reconciliation. Finally, corrective controls provides a remedy 
to problems that have occurred within an organization. Corrective controls look to identify a 
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cause, to correct the errors, and also to 
modify a system in order to prevent future 
problems.  
 
When analyzing a company’s internal 
controls, it is suggested to utilize the 
framework devised by COSO. This 
organization combines several accounting 
organizations including the American 
Accounting Association (AAA), the 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), Financial Executives 
International (FEI), The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National Association of 
Accountants, which is now the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). With the 
partnership of several influential accounting parties, COSO has been able to develop an evolving 
framework which helps companies “design and implement internal controls, increase control 
effectiveness, and decrease vulnerable areas” (McNally, 2013, pg. 3). The framework can be seen 
as Figure 2. Visually, this framework promotes coherent regulations across a company. Business 
objectives, internal control functions, and the employees of a company must all be synchronized 
in order for the framework to be successful.  
 
In order to analyze COSO’s effectiveness in preventing fraud through internal controls, it is 
necessary to break down the different components in the COSO framework. This evaluation will 
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Figure 2: Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) Framework, 2013
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continue to reference Figure 2. The top of the cube is concerned with a business’ objectives, 
which include operations, reporting, and compliance objectives. Operations objectives 
effectively and efficiently maintain company performance and profitability. Reporting objectives 
involve the accuracy, completeness, and reliability of company reports and statements. Finally, 
compliance objectives hold a company responsible for following the laws and regulations 
enacted by government agencies, such as the SEC. The right side of the cube outlines the various 
levels of employees working at a company. This articulates that a company must impose a top-
to-bottom approach when implementing internal controls in order to unify all areas of the 
business. The front facing side of the COSO framework involves the components for effectively 
creating, maintaining, and managing internal controls. Each provides an essential element to the 
success of a company's internal control system.  
 
The five components of the COSO framework are as follows: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities. Each is 
described as follows. The combination of these components offers a guidance for companies 
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• The Control Environment 
The control environment establishes a culture of a company which serves as the 
foundation for awareness and support of company policies. Factors involved in the control 
environment are management philosophy, ethical values, and human resource standards.
• Risk Assessment 
Risk is the possibility an event will occur to adversely affect organization objectives. Risks 
are assessed in order to determine a company’s ability to achieve its objectives.
• Control Activities  
The control activities component creates policies and procedures that can provide 
reasonable assurance for company objectives. Control policies and procedures are 
established and implemented throughout an organization in order to achieve a cohesive 
internal control structure. Examples of controls can include authorizations, document 
design, safeguards, and independent checks. 
• Information and Communication  
Information and communication allows a company's internal control system to collect and 
exchange information needed to maintain its operations. Effective communication is 
facilitated up, down, and across a company in order to provide a clear understanding of 
business operations and control activities.
• Monitoring Activities  
Monitoring activities are used to assess the quality of an internal control system. 
Monitoring can include evaluation of system design, as well as, a function of a system’s 
effectiveness in preventing, detecting, and correcting problem areas.  
The Business of Fraud
 
Each COSO component has several principles underneath. The principles are requirements and 
initiatives set to maximize the relevance of the internal control component.  Both the components 
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Table 1: COSO Internal Control Framework Components and Principles
Control Environment 1. Commitment to integrity and ethical values.
2. Board of directors is independent of management and exercise 
oversight for the development and performance of internal controls.
3. Management establishes structures, reporting lines, and appropriate 
authority and responsibility in pursuit of objectives.
4. Organization commits to attract, develop, and retain competent 
individuals in alignment with objectives.
5. Organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control 
responsibilities.
Risk Assessment 6. Organization specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable the 
identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives.
7. Identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives across the entity and 
analyzes risks as a basis for determining how the risk should be 
managed.
8. Considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks.
9. Identifies and assess changes that could significantly impact the system 
of internal control.
Control Activities 10. Selects and develops control activities that contribute to the mitigation of 
risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable levels. 
11. Selects and develops general controls activities over technology to 
support the achievement of objectives.




13. Generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the 
functioning of other components of internal controls.
14. Internally communicates information including objective and 
responsibilities for internal controls.
15. Communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the 
functioning of other components of internal control.
Monitoring Activities 16. The organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing evaluations to 
ascertain whether the components of internal control are present and 
functioning.
17. Evaluates and communicates internal control deficiencies in a timely 
manner to parties responsible for taking corrective action.
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The COSO framework provides a company with a foundation for effective internal controls. 
However, there are requirements for the framework’s success. The components and principles 
outlined above must be present and functioning within a company (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). To be 
present and functioning within a system, a control must first exist, and then be conducted in a 
manner that achieves organizational objectives. Another requirement is that the COSO 
components are integrated; the components are interdependent and have multiple 
interrelationships and linkages, which requires that they all operate together (COSO, 2014, par. 
1-5). The successful implementation of the COSO framework is necessary for its effectiveness. 
Deficiencies can cause a company to be susceptible to fraudulent acts.  
 
Technology has become integrated within companies and can be used effectively as an internal 
control. Correctly implementing preventative, detective, and corrective controls will be an 
impactful tool in deterring the likelihood of fraud within a company, which can be assisted 
through the use of control technology. Elaborate information systems and resource management 
programs often involve complex codes, protections, and safeguards. While the magnitude of 
these functions are beneficial to an extent, integrating basic technology procedures in a company 
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Research Questions to be Answered  
Methodology  
The research method used throughout this thesis was empirical and analytical. Research was 
focused on recent fraudulent acts posted through the United States Attorney’s Office. The press 
releases issued by this office provided sources of recent claims of fraud that were compared 
categorically. As a way of providing consistent research, the search was limited to frauds with 
press releases in 2016, which approximated 1,900 case files. It was assumed that most fraudulent 
acts happened in years prior to the court hearing issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In this 
way, all information corresponds will press releases dated in 2016, regardless of the year the 
fraud was committed. Another filter applied to the search was based on location. The court cases 
and fraudulent acts that were analyzed were based in: Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin.  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1. What set of internal controls could have been used to prevent recent actions of fraud?
2. How could internal controls be improved with technology?
3. Which COSO components/principles are undermined most frequently when fraudulent  
acts are committed? How do vulnerabilities within the COSO framework correlate to 
recent fraud cases?






Table 3: Number of Frauds Gathered per State
The Business of Fraud
Elimination of cases based on type of fraud was necessary in order to provide a cohesive data set.  
For example, governmental frauds, such as insurance and health care fraud, and individual’s 
frauds were not used in the sample. Research was narrowed down by keywords and phrases 
based on the type of fraud committed. Examples of these terms included: fraud, embezzlement, 
laundering, etc. Based on the source parameters, the following data was collected for each case:  
 
The companies and fraud cases in this table will serve as the basis for evaluation of technology 
based internal controls (See Appendix A). Information collected from recent fraud cases will test 
COSO components and principles for vulnerabilities. Conclusions will be dependent on the 
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• Company/Institution
• Type of Company
• Individual(s)
• Position
• Guilty of (type of fraud)
• Convicted (yes or no)
• U.S. State Crime was Committed
• U.S. Attorney’s District
• U.S. State Crime was Tried in
• Level of Court
• Outcome of Case
• Year(s) of Crime
• Year of Press Release (U.S. Attorney’s Office)
• Description of Fraud





• Information and Communication
• Monitoring Activities
• COSO Principle(s)
• Main four principles documented
• Internal Control(s)
• Technology Functions 
• Other Recommendations
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deficiencies of the COSO framework and the implementation of specific technology functions 
within a company’s internal control structure. These factors can be assessed based on the internal 
control’s effectiveness at preventing, correcting, and detecting fraud. This thesis will expand on 
the information within the table, providing examples on the types of fraudulent acts committed 
and assessing the internal controls.  
 
Results  
Research of the frauds within the study helped to determine weaknesses in COSO principles 
when fraud occurred. These areas are indicators of vulnerabilities, which were then analyzed 
based on principles of the framework. Through the determination of the most violated framework 
areas, conclusions on internal controls were made. The results provided a more in-depth analysis 
on ways to prevent fraud, data is shown in Appendix A. Evaluation of these fraud cases creates 
generalizations that other companies can use in order to minimize their susceptibility to fraud. It 
also ascertains which parts of COSO to emphasize when connecting fraudulent cases to internal 
control systems. As outlined throughout this report, decreasing fraudulent risk is beneficial for a 
company’s financial position and the economy as a whole.  
 
The results of this study combine both similarities and differences of the fraud cases in order to 
gain a more wholistic conclusion. By researching companies across different industries, the 
capacity of fraud and its prevalence in even well-known corporations is articulated. Since there 
are a variety of types and variations of fraud, it will be necessary to remain free of absolutions. 
There is no guarantee of the prevention of all types of fraud, however, certain measures can be 
put in place to reduce the risk. These measures are articulated in the findings. The COSO 
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framework outlines requirements of internal controls which are proven to mitigate fraud risk. 
This thesis looks to show the importance of internal controls, and specifically technology 
measures to implement and enhance these controls. Trends based on the information collected 
are highlighted below. Each conclusion relates the sample of fraud cases to internal controls and 
the COSO framework. The results are beneficial to companies looking to mitigate their 
susceptibility to fraud because of the conclusion’s versatility and adaptability.  
Position Analysis
Data collected from the sample included the perpetrator of the fraud and their position within 
the company.  Analysis of position is important because it relates to the first component of 
the COSO framework, control environment. COSO defines the control environment as: “the 
set of standards, processes, and structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal 
control across the organization” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). The control environment is defined 
at the top of the organization, in positions such as the board of directors and senior 
management, if applicable. For smaller, local businesses, the top of the organization may be 
limited to the owner/operator. In either instance, the control environment sets the standard for 
integrity, ethical values, corporate responsibly, and a hierarchy of authority within a company  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The ACFE Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud 
Study, has determined trends in fraud cases around the world. One of their conclusions relates 
to the control environment by analyzing fraud cases based on the position of the perpetrator.  
Their data is depicted as Figure 3 above.  
The relevant component of this graph is the line, depicting the percent of fraud cases that 
relate to each position. Employee level positions comprise of 40.9% of fraud cases studied, 
manager, 36.8%, owner/executive, 18.9%, and other, 3.4%. The bar graph component 
measures median financial loss of the company based on the frauds committed in each 
position, this information was not evaluated in the thesis project. The control environment 
influences each level of authority in a company. Lenient regulation or poor supervision of 
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Figure 3: Report to the Nations On Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study  
(ACFE, 2016, pg. 49).
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employees can be explanations for why 40.9% of company employees were able to commit 
fraud. This correlation can be drawn because a lack of a control environment creates a lack of 
responsibility and authority within the organization.
The fraud cases examined through the U.S. Attorney’s Office produced contrasting results to 
the Report to the Nations. Figure 4 depicts the data collected for the purpose of this thesis:
 
For the purpose of this study, the following labels were created: top level, middle 
management, and employee. The composition of these roles include:
• Top level — owner, co-owner, operator, executive director, president, vice-











Figure 4: Position Analysis for Fraud
The Business of Fraud
• Middle management — general manager, treasurer, supervisor, office manager, 
senior payroll specialist, administrative manager, portfolio manager, business 
manager, IT manager, and sheriff
• Employee — employee, customer, financial advisor, business relationship 
coordinator, bookkeeper, trader, accountant, city clerk, financial secretary, 
investment broker, sales representative, and customer service representative
 
The graph depicts that top level management committed 45% of fraud cases, middle 
management, 19%, and employees, 36%. Differences from the Report to the Nations and this 
thesis data can be attributed to the scope of the data gathered. The thesis data was composed 
of smaller scale frauds, evaluated in a limited geographic area in the United States. Despite 
these differences, common conclusions can be drawn from the results.
The control environment of a company has a significant impact on the level within a 
company where fraud is committed. Executive level frauds establish a negative tone for 
employees regarding the ethical standards and responsibility of all employees. This can 
contribute to fraud being committed at lower levels within a company. Companies have a 
responsibility to successfully create a strong control environment. The environmental 
structure of a company, if incorporated effectively, is an internal control.  
 
Type of Fraud Committed
There are two types of fraud recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA): financial statement fraud and asset misappropriation. As indicated 
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earlier, financial statement fraud is the intentional misstatement of financial statements, 
whereas misappropriation of assets is the theft of company assets (AICPA, 2002, pg. 1722). 
For the purpose of this research, analysis focused on financial statement fraud, asset 
misappropriation, and corruption. Corruption is seen as a third type of fraud in the Corporate 
Fraud Handbook by J.T. Wells. In this publication, corruption is defined as “an act done with 
the intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of 
others” (Wells, 2011, pg. 259). Each category, financial statement fraud, asset 
misappropriation, and corruption, is broken down based on a hierarchy and sub network. The 















The Business of Fraud
• Financial statement fraud
• Financial
• Asset/revenue overstatements — timing differences, fictitious 
revenues, concealed liabilities and expenses, improper 
disclosures, improper asset valuations
• Asset/revenue understatements




• Larceny — of cash on hand, from the deposit, other
• Skimming
• Sales — unrecorded
• Receivables — write-off schemes, lapping schemes, 
unconcealed 
• Refunds and other
• Fraudulent disbursements
• Billing schemes — shell company, non-accomplice 
vendor, personal purchases
• Payroll schemes — ghost employees, commission 
schemes, workers’ compensation, falsified wages
• Expense reimbursement schemes — mischaracterized 
expenses, overstated expenses, fictitious expenses, 
multiple reimbursements
• Check tampering — forged maker, forged endorsement, 
altered payee, concealed checks, authorized maker
• Register disbursement — false voids, false refunds 
• Inventory and all other assets
• Misuse
• Larceny — asset requisition and transfers, false sales and 
shipping, purchasing and receiving, unconcealed larceny
• Corruption
• Conflicts of interest — purchase schemes, sales schemes, other
• Bribery — invoice kickbacks, bid riggings, other
• Illegal gratuities 
• Economic extortion
This breakdown of fraud allows for consistent analysis and classification for fraud cases. The 
hierarchy was used for this purpose in the thesis research data set. Following a standard for 
classification and using common terminology when researching fraud cases allowed for 
conclusions to be made based on the frequency each type of fraud occurs. Figure 5 
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documents the three categories of fraud, and their occurrence within the thesis data.  
 
Asset misappropriation is the most common type of fraud from the data set, which is 
consistent with research done through the ACFE Report to the Nations. Both financial 
statement fraud and corruption make up smaller percentages of the overall data. In order to 
document the use of Well’s fraud hierarchy, each category of fraud was broken down based 
on various levels. 
First, financial statement fraud was analyzed based on the initial layer of characterization, 
financial or non-financial. Figure 6 is depicted below, highlighting the prevalence of financial 
instances. ACFE Report to the Nations emphasizes that, although financial statement fraud is 
not as common, it is very costly to an organization. According to the ACFE data, financial 
statement fraud occurred in less than 10% of cases, but caused a median loss of $975,000 












Figure 5: Type of Fraud Committed
The Business of Fraud
 
Next, asset misappropriation was evaluated based on the theft of cash and the occurrence of 
larceny, skimming, and fraudulent disbursements. According to the thesis data, the theft of 
cash was more common at 90%, than the misappropriation of inventory and other assets, 
which composed of 10% of the cases studied. The ACFE reports that asset misappropriation 
was the most common type of fraud, indicated in more than 83% of cases, but it was the 
lowest median loss at $125,000 (ACFE, 2016, pg. 4). Larceny, skimming, and fraudulent 
disbursements are the second layer of characterization based on Wells hierarchy. The 






























Figure 6: Frequency of Financial Statement Fraud
The Business of Fraud
Finally, forms of corruption were analyzed to determine the frequency of their occurrence 
within the data set. Corruption has one layer of characteristics, and of that, only two were 
determined to be present within the cases researched. It was determined that conflicts of 
interest and economic extortion were the types of corruption within the data. The ACFE data 
determined that corruption cases were in the middle of financial statement fraud and asset 
misappropriation with 35.4% of cases being reported as such, and a median loss of $200,000 
(ACFE, 2016, pg. 4). Figure 8 depicts the frequency of conflicts of interest, composed of 


























Figure 7: Frequency of Asset Misappropriation Based Fraud









The culmination of primary thesis data and ACFE research draws similar conclusions. Asset 
misappropriation is the most common type of fraud, in comparison to corruption and 
financial statement frauds. By documenting each type of fraud and characterizing based on 
Well’s hierarchy, comparisons and trends across the different cases can be analyzed. These 
trends can be compared to the COSO framework, which evaluates internal controls. Risk 
assessment is a COSO component that can be directly related to fraud prevention and 
detection.
Risk assessment manages business risk from both external and internal sources. It involves 
the identification and assessment of risks, as well as, risk tolerances (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). 
COSO had determined that management has the responsibility to establish company 
objectives in relation to operations, reporting, and compliance standards (COSO, 2014, par. 





























Figure 8: Frequency of Corruption Based Fraud
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fraud. Management objectives should successfully outline the responsibility of employees in 
relation to fraud risk. Operation objectives look to minimize the risk of asset 
misappropriation, reporting objectives minimize financial statement fraud, and compliance 
standards set regulations for corruption. Successful risk management of a company identifies 
weaknesses in internal controls which can be influenced by both internal factors, such as 
fraud, and external factors. 
COSO Components and Principles
The COSO framework involves both components and principles, which are outlined and 
described previously. The data was categorized and analyzed based on both the COSO 
components and principles violated within each fraudulent act. The frequency of violations 
can determine a pattern of weaknesses in company internal controls. Fraud cases were 
assessed independently, and it was found that each case violated one or more COSO 
component and principle. Figures 9 and 10 show the frequency each COSO component and  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Figure 9: Frequency of COSO Component Violation
The Business of Fraud
 
 
principle was faulted, respectively. The COSO principles are coordinated to the components 
via color.  
 
Discussion of each COSO component is provided below with COSO principles embedded 
within the analysis. This section describes the elements within fraud cases that designated a 
violation, and includes an example from the data set that emphasizes the violation of each 
principle. 
Control Environment 
The control environment was the most prominently violated COSO component. This result is 
expected since an entity’s ethical standards and obligations directly relates to fraud risk and 
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the control environment. To violate the control environment component, the fraud case must 
have depicted any of the following factors: lack of integrity, no management oversight of 
internal controls, no hierarchy of authority or responsibility for employees, faltered 
alignment of organizational objectives, or lack of accountability for internal controls. These 
criteria are directly related COSO principles of the control environment.
An example of a control environment violation from the thesis data set is Fraud Case #53. As 
a brief summary, Stuart B. Millner and Associates is an auction business in the eastern 
district of Missouri, owned and operated by Stuart Millner. Millner misdirected profit and 
sales revenue from auction clients to pay company expenses. He reported to customers that 
auctioned items had sold for less than they actually were (Department of Justice, 2016).
The control environment was violated in this example due to the fact the owner of the 
company did not act ethically when selling customer property. Top management is expected 
to “establish directives, guidance, and control to enable management and other personnel to 
understand and carry out their internal control responsibilities” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). The 
design and evaluation for authority responsibility were not executed with respect to internal 
controls functions. These weaknesses were discussed as part of the data evaluation for each 
case. Possible internal controls and technology functions of the internal controls were 
addressed for each case as well. For this example, possible internal controls for Fraud Case 
#53 include the requirement of client approvals for deposits and withdrawals, and also 
segregation of duties between custody of goods and reporting of sales. Also, the 
reconciliation of company revenue accounts and customer revenue accounts to verify sales 
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price would be beneficial. Technological functions include automatically entering sales 
transactions into the company accounting system so no falsification can be made. It was also 
noted as an additional recommendation that oversight is important because the owner of the 
company committed the fraud. In this example, oversight could be potentially from city 
governance.  
 
COSO principles can also be evaluated. In Fraud Case #53, several principles can be 
identified as being negligent within this organization. With relation to the control 
environment, this case violated COSO principle number three. The principle states: 
“management establishes structures, reporting lines, and appropriate authority and 
responsibility in pursuit of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). As indicated above, Stuart B. 
Millner and Associates disregards internal controls and ethical standards. Specifically, their 
lack in segregation of responsibilities within the company provided an opportunity to commit 
fraud, which directly correlates with COSO principle number three. Each level of the 
company should have designated authorities and responsibilities which provide for a distinct 
hierarchy of the control environment. The implementation of these internal controls would 
create a system of accountability for the company, set a tone of compliance, and reduce fraud 
risk.
A lack of a strong control environment, or any COSO component, makes a company more 
susceptible to fraud. The control environment in particular sets a strong foundation for a 
company which reinforces the expectations throughout the various levels of an organization 
(COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). When there is a lack in the control environment, the support for the 
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other COSO components is also lacking, which increases a corporations fraud risk. Investing 
in the development of a sufficient control environment can be instrumental in a company’s 
success.  
Control Activities
The next most violated COSO component was control activities. A lack of control activities 
provides an opportunity for fraud, which is illustrated above as a component of the fraud 
triangle. Control activities are defined as “actions established through policies and procedures 
that help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to the achievement of 
objectives are carried out” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violation of this component requires 
evidence of any of the following aspects: lack of development in internal controls for 
organizational objectives, no technological controls to support organizational objectives, or 
no expectations deployed regarding control activities. Again, these criteria directly relate to 
the control activity COSO principles. 
An example involving the violation of the control activities component is Fraud Case #3. 
This case involved Stadium Grill, a restaurant in the central district of Illinois. James Michael 
Hill, the general manager, committed wire fraud from 2009-2013. Hill had access to the 
restaurant accounting system in order to correct employee errors in entering purchases. He 
changed records to delete certain cash sales, decrease the amounts of cash sales, and classify 
cash sales as gift card purchases. He then stole and used the cash generated for his personal 
use (Department of Justice, 2016).
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This is an example of the control activities violation because there were no internal controls 
activities to prevent the misuse of accounting functions, indicating COSO principle number 
ten and eleven were misappropriated. Principle ten states: “selects and develops control 
activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to 
acceptable levels” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). While principle eleven dictates: “selects and 
develops general control activities over technology to support the achievement of objectives” 
(COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). These principles allow for successful implementation of internal 
controls within an organization, such as segregation of duties, in order to support business 
objectives. Suggestions for internal controls for Fraud Case #3 include implementation of an 
approval system that requires verification of the changes made in the company accounting 
system by an independent party, such as the owner. As a technology function, documentation 
should be maintained on the system in order to alert personnel of changes being made. These 
additions can successfully address the lack on control activities within a company. 
The control activities of an organization mitigate the opportunities for the occurrence of 
fraud. The COSO framework is a dynamic and integrated model, meaning that all the 
functions build off each other to create a cohesive set of standards for internal controls. The 
development of control activities can impact operating functions, reporting functions, and 
compliance functions within a business. In this sense, control activities can maintain dual 
purposes and promote the objectives of an organization in multiple values. The 
implementation of control activities is essential for a company to achieve its objectives. 
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Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an important component within a company’s internal control network, and 
it was also frequently violated within the fraud case study. To understand risk assessment, the 
definition of risk related to fraud and internal controls is: “the possibility that an event will 
occur and adversely affect the achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). 
Subsequently, COSO defines risk assessment as a “dynamic and iterative process for 
identifying and assessing risks to the achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). For 
the purpose of this study, violation of the risk assessment components include the misuse of 
risk assessment principles; examples include: unclear definition of organizational objectives, 
no risks were identified or analyzed, lack of consideration in the potential of fraud, or no 
assessed changes or implementation of changes that could have impacted the internal control 
system. 
An example of faulty risk assessment is documented as Fraud Case #26. Marty Turner Farms 
operates in the central district of Illinois. Amy Ward was the bookkeeper in this institution 
and she committed bank fraud from 2011-2015. The owners of the company left pre-signed 
checks in Ward’s care when they were expected to be gone for long periods of time. Ward 
wrote these checks to herself and deposited them in an account she shared with her husband. 
She created fraudulent entries in the accounting software program to conceal her actions 
(Department of Justice, 2016).
This case illustrates a lack of risk assessment principles, specifically principle number eight 
which states: “considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). 
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The owners of the company did not evaluate the potential risks of fraud or how these actions 
could go against company objectives based on their actions regarding the management of 
their business. Internal controls that could be implemented in regard to Fraud Case #26 
include the requirement for reconciliation of accounting records to account balances. Also, 
segregation of duties should be implemented, one employee should write the checks, and an 
independent employee should enter the information into the accounting system. As a 
technology function, there could be a notification system that alerts an outside management 
member of account disbursements. These functions could effectively demonstrate risk 
assessment procedures and mitigate the opportunity for fraud. 
In reiteration, the COSO frameworks is an all encompassing tool for a company. Risk 
assessment is dependent on the prior establishment of organizational objectives, authority 
and responsibility platforms, and the creation of control activities (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). All 
organizations face risk independent of size, structure, industry, and level. Assessing risks 
requires the identification of various internal and external possibilities that may adversely 
affect a company. Although risks cannot be reduced to zero, strategic risks can be monitored 
and evaluated, and unfavorable risks can be set to tolerant levels through internal controls.    
Information and Communication
Information within an organization is a constant, dynamic tool. Information documentation 
and communication is a regularly occurring activity within an internal control system.  
COSO denotes that it is management’s responsibility to “obtain or generate and use relevant 
and quality information from both internal and external sources to support the functioning of 
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other components of internal controls” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violations of the information 
and communication component include: generation of faulty or error-based information, lack 
of internal communication, or lack of external communication. These violations correlate 
with the information and communication principles outlined by COSO. 
For example, Fraud Case #4 describes a fraud committed within John Deere and Company 
by Harvey Ulfers, an employee. Ulfers committed wire fraud and money laundering from 
2004-2013. He created falsified internal documents that allowed him to sell scrap metal 
below market value. He also used a third party to launder the fraudulent proceeds for his own 
personal use. 
Ulfers violated the information and communication COSO component and principles. There 
were weaknesses in John Deere’s internal controls in regard to creating these documents, 
providing Ulfers with the opportunity to produce and communicate fraudulent information. 
These activities are related to COSO principle number thirteen. Principle thirteen states: 
“generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the functioning of other 
components of internal controls” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Within this principle is the 
requirement and expectation to identify factors such as the timeliness, accuracy, accessibility, 
and completeness of information used by a company. Also, data processing and 
transformation based on this information should be monitored in order to continuously 
generate relevant and quality information. Types of internal controls that could have been 
initiated within Fraud Case #4 include maintaining a valid price list that documents the range 
of acceptable selling prices for a product. Also, sales should be verified based on the 
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selection of reputable and approved purchasers. For technology functions, sales should be 
required to be entered based on the price list. In addition, the sales should be verified with the 
accounts receivable and revenue account in order to maintain accurate information. Likewise, 
the purchases should be verified with the approved list of companies. These controls would 
increase the reliability of both information and communication within the organization and 
externally. 
Company generated information relies on the functions of the other COSO components. 
Relevant and accurate information will be gathered based on proper control environment 
standards and implementation of control activities. Even more, the issuance of quality 
information will return to support the other functions of the COSO components by ensuring 
the authenticity of the organization. Both internal and external sources use company 
produced information, therefore the quality of communication regarding this information also 
supports organizational objectives. 
Monitoring Activities
The last COSO component, and least violated according to the thesis data set, is monitoring 
activities. Monitoring activities are defined as “ongoing evaluations, separate evaluations, or 
some combination of the two used to ascertain whether each of the five components of 
internal control are present and functioning” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Violations of the COSO 
component are likewise violations of the COSO principles, including: no evaluations 
regarding an entity’s internal controls, or lack of communication regarding internal control 
deficiencies. 
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An example of violation of monitoring activities is Fraud Case #43. Starkey Laboratories Inc. 
located in Minnesota faced several fraudulent actions. Jerome Ruzicka, Scott Nelson, 
Lawrence Miller, Jeffrey Taylor, and Lawrence Hagen were employees of the company and 
were charged with embezzlement. The employees created a fictitious company to which 
Starkey was required to pay consulting fees and commissions to. The money was directed to 
the fraudsters’ bank accounts, and no services were provided. Also, they used their fake 
company to buy discounted merchandise, which they then re-sold to other manufacturers for 
profit. The employees also forged signatures to transfer assets to their fake companies. 
Starkey’s company reports were falsified in order to conceal the transfer of money 
(Department of Justice, 2016).
Due to the large number of fraudulent acts committed by these employees, it is evident that 
Starkey lacks sufficient monitoring activities. Evaluation of internal controls should prove 
shortcomings in several processes, which should be influenced by all five COSO 
components, and several COSO principles. A specific principle violated is number sixteen: 
“the organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing evaluations to ascertain whether 
the components of the internal control are present and functioning” (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). 
The lack of such evaluations contributes to the fraud risk within the organization. Internal 
controls that should be present for Fraud Case #43 include the monitoring of employee 
activists to determine risks associated with certain authorization procedures, the assessment 
of employee accountability, and the segregation of duties within the accounting system. For 
technology functions, the company accounting system should automatically enter 
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transactions. There should also be a system for monitoring account activity, in which there is 
a detection process for unusual and suspicious activities. Finally, there should be an approved 
vendor list in which a company approves the suppliers of services. These records should be 
maintained and updated by authorized personnel. 
Monitoring activities can be broken down into two categories: ongoing evaluations and 
separate evaluations (COSO, 2014, par. 1-5). Ongoing evaluations provide timely 
information by continuously referencing a specific business process; whereas separate 
evaluations are determined by management based on business objectives. Both types of 
monitoring activities assess whether internal controls are present and functioning. Evaluating 
the effectiveness of an internal control is necessary in order to prevent, detect, and correct 
fraudulent acts. 
Limitations
The limitations of this research provide a holistic analysis of the data set. In particular, the 
number of sources evaluated was limited in scope. All data is attributed to the Department of 
Justice press release files, which documents prosecuted, high-profile cases. This source had 
limitations individually, as it provided concise and limited details regarding the cases evaluated. 
In addition, data from this source was filtered to only encompass financial fraud in the Midwest 
during 2016. Further details and a broader scope would have provided a richer analysis and 
created a stronger support for the applied conclusions.  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Conclusion
Fraud has financial, economic, and social bearings for an organization. Understanding why, 
when, and where corporate fraud happened provided conclusions on how to mitigate fraud risk 
within an organization. The evaluation of positions concludes the likelihood of fraud based on 
level of employee, while the evaluation of the type of fraud indicates which type of fraud is most 
likely to be committed within an organization. Through the assessment of each COSO 
component, in relation to COSO principles, generalized internal control activities and technology 
functions were identified. These results portrayed trends which can be versatile and applied to a 
variety of organizations; while the documentation of these cases provided insights on how to 
routinely improve internal control functions. Understanding each component and principle 
within the COSO framework allowed for recommendations to be made to decrease the 
opportunity and potential for fraud risk.  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C
reate and approved vendor/supplier list. Authorization 
and background inform
ation m
ust be approved in order 
to add/change inform
ation on the list. R
econcile 
account balances to statem
ents.
Autom
atically enter transactions into com
pany accounting 
system




ade in specific accounts. 
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econcile the check records w
ith the balance in the 
com
pany bank accounts. 
Autom















econcile original data w
ith records at the end 
of the year.
Autom
atically enter transactions into com
pany accounting 
system




ade in specific accounts. 
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reate a notification system









ployee activities to determ
ine the risks 
associated w
ith certain authorization procedures. Verify 
invoices and purchase orders w










onitoring for accounts to 




ployee activities to determ
ine the risks 
associated w
ith certain authorization procedures. 
Separate duty for som
eone to m
aintain count of 
inventory in the bank vault.
Install security cam
eras inside the vault in order to deter 
stealing. C





ployees accessed the m






ployee activities to determ
ine the risks 
associated w
ith certain authorization procedures. 
Separate duty for som
eone to access financial records 
and som
eone w




reate a notification system





ber of expenses charged to the account. 
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ust be reconciled w
ith other accounts.
